thesis of federalist 51

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The first amendment, historic document, federalist 51 (1788).

James Madison | 1788

On February 8, 1788, James Madison published Federalist 51—titled “The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.” In this famous Federalist Paper essay, Madison explained how the Constitution’s structure checked the powers of the elected branches and protected against possible abuses by the national government. With the separation of powers, the Framers divided the powers of the national government into three separate branches: a legislative branch (called Congress), an executive branch (led by a single President), and a judicial branch (headed by a Supreme Court). By dividing political power between the branches, the Framers sought to prevent any single branch of government from becoming too powerful. At the same time, each branch of government was also given the power to check the other two branches. This is the principle of checks and balances. Madison and his fellow Framers assumed that human nature was imperfect and that all political elites would seek to secure greater political power. As a result, the Framers concluded that the best way to control the national government was to harness the political ambitions of each branch and use them to check the ambitions of the other branches.

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In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. . . .

It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. . . .

In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. . . . It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.

There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. . . .

Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.

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Historyplex

Summary and Analysis of James Madison’s Federalist No. 51

Federalist No. 51 advocates the balance of power in the US government by the principle of 'checks and balances'. For better understanding, this Historyplex post gives you the summary of Federalist No. 51, as well as the analysis of its main points.

Federalist No. 51 advocates the balance of power in the US government by the principle of ‘checks and balances’. For better understanding, this Historyplex post gives you the summary of Federalist No. 51, as well as the analysis of its main points.

Did You Know?

The identity of the authors of the Federalist Papers was kept a secret. James Madison published his essays using the name ‘Publius’.

Federalist No. 51 was an essay published by American politician and statesman, James Madison, on February 6, 1788. It was the fifty-first paper in a series of 85 articles that are collectively known as the Federalist Papers. These articles were aimed at modifying public opinion in favor of ratifying the new US Constitution.

These papers had several authors besides Madison, like Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, who were all federalists, giving the essays their name. Despite the contributions of these authors, James Madison alone was given the most credit for publishing these papers. His fame increased after he became President, and was later given the title of ‘Father of the American Constitution.’ On the other hand, a group of people called the anti-federalists campaigned against the new constitution, believing that it would lead to a corrupt government. Finally, the federalists won, and the new constitution was ratified on June 21, 1788.

Federalist No. 51 tries to explain how the new constitution will prevent departments of the government from intruding into each others’ domains, besides giving citizens the power to prevent their elected representatives from abusing their powers. It believes in the system of ‘checks and balances’, in which the government is divided into different departments which have conflicting powers that balance out each other. What is really interesting in this essay is the detailed analysis of various institutions, which is known today as ‘the theory of institutional design.’ Federalist No. 51 also gives an explanation about how the rights of minorities will be protected by the constitution. Here are the main points of this essay.

Summary of Federalist No. 51

In the essay, James Madison says that there is a need to partition power amongst the various departments of the government as the US Constitution mandates. This has to be done by creating a government that establishes such mutual relations between its departments, which prevents one from interfering in the affairs of the other.

Madison further adds that without going into intricate details, he will try to point out what is the ideal division of power that the constitution envisioned. He says that the independence of the departments is only possible if members of each department have as little control as possible over the appointment and tenure of the members of other departments. This would probably mean that the members of all the three branches of the US Government―the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary―should be elected by the citizens. However, there has to be some deviation to this rule in case of the judiciary, since the judges need to have certain educational and moral standards that the common public may not understand. Besides, the judges hold tenure for life, which makes it difficult for other departments to control them.

The remuneration offered to the members of one department must also not be controlled by any other department. To prevent encroachment of one department on another, certain constitutional powers should be provided. The ambitions of members should be in sync with the independence of their departments, as is required by the constitution. Madison also points out that the need to make departments independent from each other is because of man’s nature to usurp others’ powers. The principle of creating divisions and subdivisions to keep each other in check is present in all endeavors, both public and private.

Madison further adds that a perfectly equal division of power is against the Republican nature of the US Government, since the legislature has to be the most powerful arm of the government, according to this system. However, any misuse can be checked by dividing the legislature into various branches; the members of which are elected by different channels, thus making them independent. The executive wing of the government has to be strengthened to counteract the effects of the strong legislature, but giving it absolute power to completely annul the decisions of the legislative may be counterproductive. This power may either not be imposed firmly or it may be abused to cripple the legislative.

After giving these observations, Madison points out a few interesting things about the Federal nature of the American Government. This system divides the government into two parts; each is then divided and subdivided further into various departments that keep a check on each others’ excesses. This provides a ‘double security’ to the citizens. Further, society has to be handled in such a way that its major faction does not stifle the rights of the minority. This can be done either by creating a powerful, authoritarian government which cannot be dissuaded by the majority, or by dividing the society itself into so many different classes that any single group cannot impose its own views. The later method is granted to the US Government by its constitution.

Madison says that the security of citizens will depend on the diversity of sects and interests throughout the country. A federal republic is in the interests of the citizens, since a country which consists of many states and confederacies will lead to oppression by the majority in each, and the laws of the republic grant enhanced powers and independence to a certain department or member to counteract against this oppression. He further adds that the main aim of any government is to establish justice, where both the weaker and stronger sects of society are protected and there is no oppression. In a state where members of the majority rule and oppress the minority sects, there is a tendency to tilt the balance in favor of a power independent of either the majority or the minority.

The federal nature of the American Government guarantees that it possesses the will to deliver justice, irrespective of the power of the strong or weak sections of society. A country of many large groups will benefit by self-governance, and despite being too large to follow a federal plan, this plan can be modified to make it both possible and practical for the United States.

☞ A department in the government may try to influence the working of another by controlling appointments, tenure, or emoluments of its members.

☞ The majority class in the society may hold sway over the government, using it to oppress the weak or minority classes of society.

☞ Giving increased powers to any one department to prevent other departments from becoming excessively powerful may backfire, as this power may be misused or used less firmly.

Solutions Given by Federalist No. 51

➤ The structure of the government should be designed in such a way that departments have their own powers, and are independent from encroachment by others.

➤ The personal interest of every member should lie in keeping members of other departments out of their way. In Madison’s own words, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”.

➤ Different departments should have contrasting powers and responsibilities to keep each in its place. For example, the US President, as the head of the executive, has the power to prevent the legislature from becoming too powerful. But if the president is found guilty of misdemeanor, i.e., he misuses his powers, he can be impeached. Thus, the legislature and executive can keep each other in check.

➤ The members of departments of the government can be elected by the citizens. Thus, the greatest control on the departments is in the hands of the people themselves, who can remove any representative who abuses his powers.

➤ The members of the judiciary, such as judges of the Supreme Court, are to be appointed by the executive, rather than the public, keeping in mind their moral and educational qualifications. These members keep the legislative and judiciary in their proper place, as they solve disputes regarding distribution of power between the two departments. Members of the judiciary also cannot be impeached by the other two branches. However, the constitution has placed controls on the judiciary, by stating that their judgments are not binding on the members of either, the legislative or the executive. It has also not given control of finances in the judiciary’s hands, which is under the control of the legislative.

➤ Checks have been placed on the executive and the legislative to prevent them from ignoring the judiciary’s interpretation of the constitutional laws. The main control is again, the people, as by ignoring the constitution, the members of the government risk insulting the people’s respect for their constitution.

➤ The legislative is prevented from becoming too powerful, by dividing it into two parts, and then subdividing each part into various subdivisions. The members of each are elected by the public via separate channels, keeping them independent from each other. Their contrasting powers also help keep each other in check.

➤ The influence of the majority faction in society can be curtailed by subdividing it into various factions, each with different aspirations. This way, any single faction is kept away from power.

➤ In a country of many states or confederacies, the members of the majority faction tend to be empowered. To keep this at bay, the powers of a specific member of the government can be increased proportionally, so as to impose a system of checks and balances.

Federalist No. 51 is one of the most popular federalist papers, because it tries to give more power to ordinary citizens, and upholds the principles of liberty and justice, which are applicable even today.

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The federalist no. 51, [6 february 1788], the federalist no. 51 1 by james madison or alexander hamilton.

[New York, February 6, 1788]

To the People of the State of New-York.

TO what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies, should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels, having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties however, and some additional expence, would attend the execution of it. Some deviations therefore from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle; first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice, which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.

But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to controul the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the state.

But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self defence. In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative, on the legislature, appears at first view to be the natural defence with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness; and on extraordinary occasions, it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied, by some qualified connection between this weaker department, and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own departmen[t]?

If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion, to the several state constitutions, and to the federal constitution, it will be found, that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.

There are moreover two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system 2 in a very interesting point of view.

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and 3 usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will controul each other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: The one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole, very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self appointed authority. This at best is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests, of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government: Since it shews that in exact proportion as the territory of the union may be formed into more circumscribed confederacies or states, oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated, the best security under the republican form, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionally increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger: And as in the latter state even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves: So in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties 4 be gradually induced by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted, that if the state of Rhode Island was separated from the confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits, would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities, that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on 5 any other principles than those of justice and the general good; and 6 there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of the major party, there must be less pretext also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter; or in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self government. And happily for the republican cause , the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle .

The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , February 6, 1788. This essay appeared on February 8 in New-York Packet and on February 11 in The [New York] Daily Advertiser . In the McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends edition this essay is numbered 51, in the newspapers it is numbered 50.

1 .  For background to this document, see “The Federalist. Introductory Note,” October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788 .

Essay 51, like essay 50, was claimed by H and Madison. The internal evidence presented by Edward G. Bourne (“The Authorship of the Federalist,” The American Historical Review , II [April, 1897], 449–51), strongly indicates Madison’s authorship. Bourne printed in parallel columns sentences from essay 51 which correspond very closely, sometimes exactly, to earlier writings by Madison. For other reasons why Madison’s claim to the authorship of this essay outweighs (but does not necessarily obviate) that of H, see “The Federalist. Introductory Note,” October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788 .

2 .  “it” substituted for “that system” in Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends .

3 .  “the” inserted at this point in Hopkins.

4 .  “or parties” omitted in Hopkins.

5 .  “upon” substituted for “on” in McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends and Hopkins.

6 .  “Whilst” substituted for “and” in McLean and Hopkins.

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US government and civics

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• The Declaration of Independence
• The Articles of Confederation
• The Constitution of the United States
• Federalist No. 10
• Brutus No. 1

Federalist No. 51

• Federalist No. 70
• Federalist No. 78
• Letter from a Birmingham Jail

The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

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Federalist 51

“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

PDF: Federalist Papers No 51

Writing Federalist 51

In this Federalist Paper, James Madison explains and defends the  checks and balances  system in the  Constitution . Each  branch of government  is framed so that its power checks the power of the other two branches; additionally, each branch of government is dependent on the people, who are the source of legitimate authority.

Madison also discusses the way republican government can serve as a check on the power of factions, and the tyranny of the majority. “[I]n the federal republic of the United States… all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.” All of the Constitution’s checks and balances, Madison concludes, serve to preserve liberty by ensuring justice. Madison explained, “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”

Madison’s political theory as expressed in this  Federalist Paper  demonstrated the influence of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws on the Founders.

Federalist 51 | Primary Source Essentials

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Federalist No. 51 by James Madison or Alexander Hamilton (1788)

• Terms and definitions
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• Index of articles
• 1.1 Alexander Hamilton
• 1.2 James Madison
• 2 Full text of The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
• 3 Background of the Federalist Papers
• 4 Full list of Federalist Papers
• 6 External links
• 7 Footnotes

Federalist Number (No.) 51 (1788) is an essay by British-American politicians Alexander Hamilton or James Madison arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution . The full title of the essay is "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay . They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation . [1]

• Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
• Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on February 8, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist , now referred to as The Federalist Papers .
• Abstract: Hamilton or Madison argue for the separation of powers and address the ways checks and balances can be created within government.

Background of the authors

This paper was written by either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison.

Alexander Hamilton

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career: [2]

• 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
• Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
• 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
• 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
• 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

James Madison

James Madison (1751-1836) was an American politician who served as the fourth president of the United States . He is considered a Founding Father of the United States and is also known as the Father of the Constitution due to his contributions to the development of the United States Constitution . Below is a summary of Madison's career: [3]

• 1775 : Joined the Virginia militia as a colonel
• 1777-1779 : Member of the Virginia Governor's Council
• 1780-1783 : Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress
• 1784-1786 : Member of the Virginia House of Delegates
• 1787 : Virginia representative to the Constitutional Convention
• 1789-1797 : Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Virginia
• 1801-1809 : Fifth U.S. secretary of state
• 1809-1817 : Fourth president of the United States

Full text of The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

The full text of Federalist No. 51 reads as follows: [1]

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Aritcles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788. [5]

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution . They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals. [6] [7] [5]

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed amended, not replaced. [6] [7] [5]

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation .

• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

External links

• Search Google News for this topic
• ↑ 1.0 1.1 Yale Law School , "The Federalist Papers: No. 51," accessed June 15, 2022
• ↑ Biography.com , "Alexander Hamilton," accessed March 6, 2018
• ↑ Biography.com , "James Madison," accessed June 16, 2018
• ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
• ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 The Federalist Papers , "THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS," accesses May 27, 2022
• ↑ 6.0 6.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive , "Federalism," accessed July 27, 2021
• ↑ 7.0 7.1 Middle Tennessee State University , "Anti-Federalists," accessed July 27, 2021
• Pages using DynamicPageList3 dplreplace parser function
• Federalism tracking
• The Federalist Papers

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Federalist Papers

By: History.com Editors

Updated: June 22, 2023 | Original: November 9, 2009

The Federalist Papers are a collection of essays written in the 1780s in support of the proposed U.S. Constitution and the strong federal government it advocated. In October 1787, the first in a series of 85 essays arguing for ratification of the Constitution appeared in the Independent Journal , under the pseudonym “Publius.” Addressed to “The People of the State of New York,” the essays were actually written by the statesmen Alexander Hamilton , James Madison and John Jay . They would be published serially from 1787-88 in several New York newspapers. The first 77 essays, including Madison’s famous Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 , appeared in book form in 1788. Titled The Federalist , it has been hailed as one of the most important political documents in U.S. history.

Articles of Confederation

As the first written constitution of the newly independent United States, the Articles of Confederation nominally granted Congress the power to conduct foreign policy, maintain armed forces and coin money.

But in practice, this centralized government body had little authority over the individual states, including no power to levy taxes or regulate commerce, which hampered the new nation’s ability to pay its outstanding debts from the Revolutionary War .

In May 1787, 55 delegates gathered in Philadelphia to address the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and the problems that had arisen from this weakened central government.

A New Constitution

The document that emerged from the Constitutional Convention went far beyond amending the Articles, however. Instead, it established an entirely new system, including a robust central government divided into legislative , executive and judicial branches.

As soon as 39 delegates signed the proposed Constitution in September 1787, the document went to the states for ratification, igniting a furious debate between “Federalists,” who favored ratification of the Constitution as written, and “Antifederalists,” who opposed the Constitution and resisted giving stronger powers to the national government.

The Rise of Publius

In New York, opposition to the Constitution was particularly strong, and ratification was seen as particularly important. Immediately after the document was adopted, Antifederalists began publishing articles in the press criticizing it.

They argued that the document gave Congress excessive powers and that it could lead to the American people losing the hard-won liberties they had fought for and won in the Revolution.

In response to such critiques, the New York lawyer and statesman Alexander Hamilton, who had served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, decided to write a comprehensive series of essays defending the Constitution, and promoting its ratification.

Who Wrote the Federalist Papers?

As a collaborator, Hamilton recruited his fellow New Yorker John Jay, who had helped negotiate the treaty ending the war with Britain and served as secretary of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation. The two later enlisted the help of James Madison, another delegate to the Constitutional Convention who was in New York at the time serving in the Confederation Congress.

To avoid opening himself and Madison to charges of betraying the Convention’s confidentiality, Hamilton chose the pen name “Publius,” after a general who had helped found the Roman Republic. He wrote the first essay, which appeared in the Independent Journal, on October 27, 1787.

In it, Hamilton argued that the debate facing the nation was not only over ratification of the proposed Constitution, but over the question of “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”

After writing the next four essays on the failures of the Articles of Confederation in the realm of foreign affairs, Jay had to drop out of the project due to an attack of rheumatism; he would write only one more essay in the series. Madison wrote a total of 29 essays, while Hamilton wrote a staggering 51.

Federalist Papers Summary

In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Jay and Madison argued that the decentralization of power that existed under the Articles of Confederation prevented the new nation from becoming strong enough to compete on the world stage or to quell internal insurrections such as Shays’s Rebellion .

In addition to laying out the many ways in which they believed the Articles of Confederation didn’t work, Hamilton, Jay and Madison used the Federalist essays to explain key provisions of the proposed Constitution, as well as the nature of the republican form of government.

'Federalist 10'

In Federalist 10 , which became the most influential of all the essays, Madison argued against the French political philosopher Montesquieu ’s assertion that true democracy—including Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers—was feasible only for small states.

A larger republic, Madison suggested, could more easily balance the competing interests of the different factions or groups (or political parties ) within it. “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests,” he wrote. “[Y]ou make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens[.]”

After emphasizing the central government’s weakness in law enforcement under the Articles of Confederation in Federalist 21-22 , Hamilton dove into a comprehensive defense of the proposed Constitution in the next 14 essays, devoting seven of them to the importance of the government’s power of taxation.

Madison followed with 20 essays devoted to the structure of the new government, including the need for checks and balances between the different powers.

'Federalist 51'

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” Madison wrote memorably in Federalist 51 . “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”

After Jay contributed one more essay on the powers of the Senate , Hamilton concluded the Federalist essays with 21 installments exploring the powers held by the three branches of government—legislative, executive and judiciary.

Impact of the Federalist Papers

Despite their outsized influence in the years to come, and their importance today as touchstones for understanding the Constitution and the founding principles of the U.S. government, the essays published as The Federalist in 1788 saw limited circulation outside of New York at the time they were written. They also fell short of convincing many New York voters, who sent far more Antifederalists than Federalists to the state ratification convention.

Still, in July 1788, a slim majority of New York delegates voted in favor of the Constitution, on the condition that amendments would be added securing certain additional rights. Though Hamilton had opposed this (writing in Federalist 84 that such a bill was unnecessary and could even be harmful) Madison himself would draft the Bill of Rights in 1789, while serving as a representative in the nation’s first Congress.

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Ron Chernow, Hamilton (Penguin, 2004). Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (Simon & Schuster, 2010). “If Men Were Angels: Teaching the Constitution with the Federalist Papers.” Constitutional Rights Foundation . Dan T. Coenen, “Fifteen Curious Facts About the Federalist Papers.” University of Georgia School of Law , April 1, 2007. 

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The Federalist Papers

Appearing in New York newspapers as the New York Ratification Convention met in Poughkeepsie, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison wrote as Publius and addressed the citizens of New York through the Federalist Papers.  These essays subsequently circulated and were reprinted throughout the states as the Ratification process unfolded in other states.  Initially appearing as individual items in several New York newspapers, all eighty-five essays were eventually combined and published as The Federalist .  Click here to view a chronology of the Printing and Reprintings of The Federalist .   

Considerable debate has surrounded these essays since their publication. Many suggest they represent the best exposition of the Constitution to date. Their conceptual design would affirm this view.  Others contend that they were mere propaganda to allay fears of the opposition to the Constitution. Regardless, they are often included in the canon of the world’s great political writings. A complete introduction exploring the purpose, authorship, circulation, and reactions to The Federalist  can be found here.

General Introduction

• No. 1 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 27 October 1787

Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

• No. 2 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 31 October 1787
• No. 3 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 3 November 1787
• No. 4 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 7 November 1787
• No. 5 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 10 November 1787

Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States

• No. 6 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 14 November 1787
• No. 7 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 17 November 1787
• No. 8 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 20 November 1787
• No. 9 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 21 November 1787

The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

• No. 10 (Madison) New York Daily Advertiser , 22 November 1787

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

• No. 11 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 24 November 1787

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue

• No. 12 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 27 November 1787

Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

• No. 13 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 28 November 1787

Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered

• No. 14 (Madison) New York Packet , 30 November 1787

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

• No. 15 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 1 December 1787
• No. 16 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 4 December 1787
• No. 17 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 5 December 1787
• No. 18 (Madison with Hamilton) New York Packet , 7 December 1787
• No. 19 (Madison with Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 8 December 1787
• No. 20 (Madison with Hamilton) New York Packet , 11 December 1787
• No. 21 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 12 December 1787
• No. 22 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 14 December 1787

The Necessity of Energetic Government to Preserve of the Union

• No. 23 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 18 December 1787

Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

• No. 24 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 19 December 1787
• No. 25 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 21 December 1787

Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense

• No. 26 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 22 December 1787
• No. 27 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 25 December 1787
• No. 28 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 26 December 1787

Concerning the Militia

• No. 29 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 9 January 1788

Concerning the General Power of Taxation

• No. 30 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 28 December 1787
• No. 31 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 1 January 1788
• Nos. 32–33 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 2 January 1788
• No. 34 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 4 January 1788
• No. 35 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 5 January 1788
• No. 36 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 8 January 1788

The Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government

• No. 37 (Madison) New York Daily Advertiser , 11 January 1788
• No. 38 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 12 January 1788

The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

• No. 39 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 16 January 1788

The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined

• No. 40 (Madison) New York Packet , 18 January 1788

General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution

• No. 41 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 19 January 1788
• No. 42 (Madison) New York Packet , 22 January 1788
• No. 43 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 23 January 1788

Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States

• No. 44 (Madison) New York Packet , 25 January 1788

Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments

• No. 45 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 26 January 1788

Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

• No. 46 (Madison) New York Packet , 29 January 1788

Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Powers

• No. 47 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 30 January 1788

Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated

• No. 48 (Madison) New York Packet , 1 February 1788

Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government

• No. 49 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 2 February 1788

Periodic Appeals to the People Considered

• No. 50 (Madison) New York Packet , 5 February 1788

Structure of Government Must Furnish Proper Checks and Balances

• No. 51 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 6 February 1788

The House of Representatives

• No. 52 (Madison?) New York Packet , 8 February 1788
• No. 53 (Madison or Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 9 February 1788

The Apportionment of Members Among the States

• No. 54 (Madison) New York Packet , 12 February 1788

The Total Number of the House of Representatives

• No. 55 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 13 February 1788
• No. 56 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 16 February 1788

The Alleged Tendency of the Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many

• No. 57 (Madison?) New York Packet , 19 February 1788

Objection That the Numbers Will Not Be Augmented as Population Increases

• No. 58 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 20 February 1788

Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

• No. 59 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 22 February 1788
• No. 60 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 23 February 1788
• No. 61 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 26 February 1788
• No. 62 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 27 February 1788
• No. 63 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 1 March 1788
• No. 64 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 5 March 1788
• No. 65 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 7 March 1788

Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments

• No. 66 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 8 March 1788

The Executive Department

• No. 67 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 11 March 1788

The Mode of Electing the President

• No. 68 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 12 March 1788

The Real Character of the Executive

• No. 69 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 14 March 1788

The Executive Department Further Considered

• No. 70 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 15 March 1788

The Duration in Office of the Executive

• No. 71 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 18 March 1788

Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered

• No. 72 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 19 March 1788

Provision for The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

• No. 73 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 21 March 1788

The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power

• No. 74 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 25 March 1788

The Treaty Making Power of the Executive

• No. 75 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 26 March 1788

The Appointing Power of the Executive

• No. 76 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 1 April 1788

Appointing Power and Other Powers of the Executive Considered

• No. 77 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 2 April 1788

The Judiciary Department

• No. 78 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788
• No. 79 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Powers of the Judiciary

• No. 80 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority

• No. 81 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Judiciary Continued

• No. 82 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury

• No. 83 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered

• No. 84 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

Concluding Remarks

• No. 85 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Significance of Federalist No. 51 in Shaping American Governance Structures

This essay about Federalist No. 51 explores its lasting impact on American political discourse. Authored by James Madison, it outlines the system of checks and balances within U.S. governance, emphasizing the separation of powers among the branches of government and the role of federalism. The essay reflects on Madison’s foresight in protecting democracy from the risks of concentrated power, and discusses ongoing debates about its relevance and application in addressing modern governance challenges.

How it works

Federalist No. 51, penned by James Madison in 1788, remains a shining beacon in American political discourse. This foundational document, birthed from the fervor of revolution and constitutional assembly, stands as a testament to the enduring dialogue between power and liberty—a dialogue that continues to shape the contours of American democracy today.

Madison, with the precision of a philosopher and the insight of a statesman, addresses the age-old challenge of designing a government that is both empowered and constrained. His famous assertion that “if men were angels, no government would be necessary” frames his exploration into the mechanisms of governance.

Madison delves into the nature of human ambition and its implications for political structures, offering a blueprint for a balanced system where power checks power.

The essence of Madison’s argument centers on the principle of checks and balances. He envisions a government where the various branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—each hold distinct powers yet constantly interact to prevent any single branch from dominating. This architecture of governance, embedded in the U.S. Constitution, acts as a safeguard against tyranny and maintains the equilibrium of power.

Beyond the separation of powers, Madison also discusses federalism—the complex relationship between national and state governments. This layered governance model reflects his understanding of ambition as a driving force in both arenas, as states and the federal government navigate their shared and separate powers.

Madison’s reflections on the judiciary are particularly prescient. He advocates for a judiciary that operates independently from the legislature, a vision that echoes through American legal history, most notably in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison. This decision underscored the judiciary’s role in upholding the Constitution and limiting the reach of the other branches, a direct reflection of Madison’s foresight.

In modern political debates, from the scope of executive power to the protection of individual liberties, the influence of Federalist No. 51 is unmistakable. However, the document is not without its detractors. Critics argue that Madison might have underestimated the role of external influences such as partisanship and financial interests in shaping governance. Others suggest that the principles of Federalist No. 51 must be reconsidered and possibly updated to address new challenges in governance, advocating for ongoing innovation in our constitutional framework.

Ultimately, Federalist No. 51 serves as a profound reminder of the power of thoughtful political theory and its capacity to guide us through complex governance issues. It invites us to draw on Madison’s insights as we continue to navigate the evolving landscape of American politics, striving toward a more equitable and just society. In this historical document, we find not only reflections of the past but also principles that guide our future.

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The Federalist Papers

What is the thesis of federalist 51.

i dont the answer

This Federalist Paper, written by James Madison focuses on the need for checks and balances in government while reminding people in government that separation of powers is critical to balance any one person or branch whose ambition is overwhelming against someone who is also overly ambitious.

Actually the exact thesis is stated in the essay itself. It is as follows: "without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles les and structure of government planned by the convention".

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Federalist 51 - Protecting the Rights of the People?

 by natalie bolton and gordon lloyd, introduction:.

To assist teachers in teaching the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Professor Gordon Lloyd  has created a website in collaboration with the Ashbrook Center at Ashland University on the Federalist and Antifederalist Debates . Professor Lloyd organizes the content of the debates in various ways on the website. Two lesson plans have been created to align with two of the most noted essays high school students are encouraged to read, Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 . Within each lesson students will use a Federalist Paper as their primary source for acquiring content.

Guiding Question:

How does Madison advocate for protections or safeguards for the rights or liberties of the people?

Learning Objectives:

After completing this lesson, students should be able to: Explain how Madison, in Federalist 51 , advocates for having a) separate branches of government, b) legislative checks and balances in the same level of government, c) a compound republic or a division of powers between the general government and state governments and (d) a multiplicity of interests and sects in society.

Background Information for the Teacher:

The years were 1787 and 1788. Along with the debate over the Constitution that was taking place in the state legislatures, an “out-of-doors” debate raged in newspapers and pamphlets throughout America’s thirteen states following the Constitutional Convention over the Constitution that had been proposed. Origin of The Federalist The eighty-five essays appeared in one or more of the following four New York newspapers: 1) The New York Journal , edited by Thomas Greenleaf, 2) Independent Journal , edited by John McLean, 3) New York Advertiser , edited by Samuel and John Loudon, and 4) Daily Advertiser , edited by Francis Childs. Initially, they were intended to be a twenty essay response to the Antifederalist attacks on the Constitution that were flooding the New York newspapers right after the Constitution had been signed in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787. The Cato letters started to appear on September 27, George Mason’s objections were in circulation and the Brutus essays were launched on October 18. The number of essays in The Federalist was extended in response to the relentless, and effective, Antifederalist criticism of the proposed Constitution. McLean bundled the first 36 essays together—they appeared in the newspapers between October 27, 1787 and January 8, 1788—and published them as Volume 1 on March 22, 1788. Essays 37 through 77 of The Federalist appeared between January 11, and April 2, 1788. On May 28, McLean took Federalist 37-77 as well as the yet to be published Federalist 78-85 and issued them all as Volume 2 of The Federalist . Between June 14 and August 16, these eight remaining essays—Federalist 78-85—appeared in the Independent Journal and New York Packet . The Status of The Federalist One of the persistent questions concerning the status of The Federalist is this: is it a propaganda tract written to secure ratification of the Constitution and thus of no enduring relevance or is it the authoritative expositor of the meaning of the Constitution having a privileged position in constitutional interpretation? It is tempting to adopt the former position because 1) the essays originated in the rough and tumble of the ratification struggle. It is also tempting to 2) see The Federalist as incoherent; didn’t Hamilton and Madison disagree with each other within five years of co-authoring the essays? Surely the seeds of their disagreement are sown in the very essays! 3) The essays sometimes appeared at a rate of about three per week and, according to Madison, there were occasions when the last part of an essay was being written as the first part was being typed. 1) One should not confuse self-serving propaganda with advocating a political position in a persuasive manner. After all, rhetorical skills are a vital part of the democratic electoral process and something a free people have to handle. These are op-ed pieces of the highest quality addressing the most pressing issues of the day. 2) Moreover, because Hamilton and Madison parted ways doesn’t mean that they weren’t in fundamental agreement in 1787-1788 about the need for a more energetic form of government. And just because they were written with certain haste doesn’t mean that they were unreflective and not well written. Federalist 10, the most famous of all the essays, is actually the final draft of an essay that originated in Madison’s Vices in 1787, matured at the Constitutional Convention in June 1787, and was refined in a letter to Jefferson in October 1787. All of Jay’s essays focus on foreign policy, the heart of the Madisonian essays are Federalist 37-51 on the great difficulty of founding, and Hamilton tends to focus on the institutional features of federalism and the separation of powers. I suggest, furthermore, that the moment these essays were available in book form, they acquired a status that went beyond the more narrowly conceived objective of trying to influence the ratification of the Constitution. The Federalist now acquired a “timeless” and higher purpose, a sort of icon status equal to the very Constitution that it was defending and interpreting. And we can see this switch in tone in Federalist 37 when Madison invites his readers to contemplate the great difficulty of founding. Federalist 38 , echoing Federalist 1 , points to the uniqueness of the America Founding: never before had a nation been founded by the reflection and choice of multiple founders who sat down and deliberated over creating the best form of government consistent with the genius of the American people. Thomas Jefferson referred to the Constitution as the work of “demigods,” and The Federalist “the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever was written.” There is a coherent teaching on the constitutional aspects of a new republicanism and a new federalism in The Federalist that makes the essays attractive to readers of every generation. Authorship of The Federalist A second question about The Federalist is how many essays did each person write? James Madison—at the time a resident of New York since he was a Virginia delegate to the Confederation Congress that met in New York—John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton—both of New York—wrote these essays under the pseudonym, “Publius.” So one answer to the question is that how many essays each person wrote doesn’t matter since everyone signed off under the same pseudonym, “Publius.” But given the iconic status of The Federalist , there has been an enduring curiosity about the authorship of the essays. Although it is virtually agreed that Jay wrote only five essays, there have been several disputes over the decades concerning the distribution of the essays between Hamilton and Madison. Suffice it to note, that Madison’s last contribution was Federalist 63 , leaving Hamilton as the exclusive author of the nineteen Executive and Judiciary essays. Madison left New York in order to comply with the residence law in Virginia concerning eligibility for the Virginia ratifying convention . There is also widespread agreement that Madison wrote the first thirteen essays on the great difficulty of founding. There is still dispute over the authorship of Federalist 50-58, but these have persuasively been resolved in favor of Madison. Outline of The Federalist A third question concerns how to “outline” the essays into its component parts. We get some natural help from the authors themselves. Federalist 1 outlines the six topics to be discussed in the essays without providing an exact table of contents. The authors didn’t know in October 1787 how many essays would be devoted to each topic. Nevertheless, if one sticks with the “formal division of the subject” outlined in the first essay, it is possible to work out the actual division of essays into the six topic areas or “points” after the fact so to speak. Martin Diamond was one of the earliest scholars to break The Federalist into its component parts. He identified Union as the subject matter of the first thirty-six Federalist essays and Republicanism as the subject matter of last forty-nine essays. There is certain neatness to this breakdown, and accuracy to the Union essays. The first three topics outlined in Federalist 1 are 1) the utility of the union, 2) the insufficiency of the present confederation under the Articles of Confederation , and 3) the need for a government at least as energetic as the one proposed. The opening paragraph of Federalist 15 summarizes the previous fourteen essays and says: “in pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the pursuance of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the ‘insufficiency of the present confederation.'” So we can say with confidence that Federalist 1-14 is devoted to the utility of the union. Similarly, Federalist 23 opens with the following observation: “the necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic as the one proposed… is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.” Thus Federalist 15-22 covered the second point dealing with union or federalism. Finally, Federalist 37 makes it clear that coverage of the third point has come to an end and new beginning has arrived. And since McLean bundled the first thirty-six essays into Volume 1, we have confidence in declaring a conclusion to the coverage of the first three points all having to do with union and federalism. The difficulty with the Diamond project is that it becomes messy with respect to topics 4, 5, and 6 listed in Federalist 1 : 4) the Constitution conforms to the true principles of republicanism , 5) the analogy of the Constitution to state governments, and 6) the added benefits from adopting the Constitution. Let’s work our way backward. In Federalist 85 , we learn that “according to the formal division of the subject of these papers announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points,” namely, the fifth and sixth points. That leaves, “republicanism,” the fourth point, as the topic for Federalist 37-84, or virtually the entire Part II of The Federalist . I propose that we substitute the word Constitutionalism for Republicanism as the subject matter for essays 37-51, reserving the appellation Republicanism for essays 52-84. This substitution is similar to the “Merits of the Constitution” designation offered by Charles Kesler in his new introduction to the Rossiter edition; the advantage of this Constitutional approach is that it helps explain why issues other than Republicanism strictly speaking are covered in Federalist 37-46. Kesler carries the Constitutional designation through to the end; I suggest we return to Republicanism with Federalist 52 . Taken from the Federalist-Antifederalist Debate .

Preparing to Teach this Lesson:

Prior to teaching this lesson the teacher should cover content related to the Articles of Confederation and its weaknesses. The teacher should familiarize her/himself with Madison’s Notes on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the following days outlined below. Gordon Lloyd has presented the content of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 as a Four Act Drama . Additionally, the teacher should cover content related to Federalist and Antifederalist debates that occurred prior to Federalist 51 being published. Three activities are outlined below and should be implemented in order. Activity 1: Federalist 51 as a Wordle. Activity 2: Interpreting and evaluating Federalist 51 using a guided reading graphic organizer. Activity 3: Discussing Federalist 51 in a Socratic seminar. For all activities, students will use Federalist 51 . To assist students in reading Federalist 51 , a paragraph-by-paragraph summary has been provided by Gordon Lloyd.

Analyzing Primary Sources:

If your students lack experience in dealing with primary sources, you might use one or more preliminary exercises to help them develop these skills. The Learning Page at the American Memory Project of the Library of Congress includes a set of such activities. Another useful resource is the Digital Classroom of the National Archives, which features a set of Document Analysis Worksheets . Finally, History Matters offers pages on “ Making Sense of Maps ” and “ Making Sense of Oral History ” which give helpful advice to teachers in getting their students to use such sources effectively.

Suggested Activities:

Activity 1: Federalist 51 as a Wordle Time required for activity: In class activity 20 minutes.

The teacher will open day one of the lesson by sharing that Federalist 51 is one of 85 essays advocating for the ratification of the United States Constitution. Federalist 51 was written by James Madison and published on February 6, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius. In this essay, Madison informed the reader of the safeguards to maintain the separate branches of government and to protect the rights of the people.

Teacher can show the Wordle of the full text of Federalist 51 and describe a Wordle to students.

Note: Wordle is an electronic application that allows “word clouds” to be generated from text. The clouds give greater prominence to words that appear more frequently in the source text. (Taken from http://www.wordle.net )

The ten most often words used by Madison to write Federalist 51 are listed below in order of use.

Analyze the Wordle of Federalist 51 that shows only the 10 most prominent words and predict what you think Madison will write about in Federalist 51 using the Think-Pair-Share handout .

Teacher will instruct students to record their response in the “think” section of the Think-Pair-Share handout . Students will then share their response with another student. As students share with one another they should write those ideas they had in common in the “pair” section of the hand out and put a (+) by those ideas. Students should then write any ideas they had that were different in this section and put a (-) by those ideas. Students should then write any new ideas that were raised and put a (*) by those ideas. Finally, the students will select one idea to share with the entire class and write it in the “share” portion of the handout. The teacher will then ask each pair to share their final idea with the class. Students should record any new ideas shared by the entire class in the “share” section of the handout.

Activity 2: Interpreting and Evaluating Federalist 51

Time required for activity: In class reading assignment and completing guided reading graphic organizer, one 45 minute class period. Students may complete individually or in small groups.

The teacher should remind students that Federalist 51 is one of 85 essays advocating for the ratification of the United States Constitution. Federalist 51 was written by James Madison and published on February 6, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius. In this essay, Madison informed the reader of the safeguards to maintain the separate branches of government and to protect the rights of the people.

Guided Reading Graphic Organizer

To help students understand the main ideas that emerged from Federalist 51 , ask students to read Federalist 51 and complete the guided reading graphic organizer . All questions in the guided reading graphic organizer are interpretative questions in the first column and evaluative questions in the second column. Note: The evaluative questions will also be used for Activity 3: Socratic Seminar .

Students may read the full text of Federalist 51 , a highlighted version of Federalist 51 , or a paragraph-by-paragraph summary of the essay written by Gordon Lloyd.

Interpretative Questions:

• Why does Madison fear “a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department” of government?
• How can government, as Madison claims, be “the greatest of all reflections on human nature”?
• How does “the multiplicity of interests” in American society protect the rights of its citizens?
• Is the author arguing that the federal government should be as accountable to any given minority as to the majority?
• Since Madison argues the Constitution would protect the rights of the minority, is he justified in believing that “a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good”?

Evaluative Questions:

• Is Madison’s opinion of the role of self-interest in the conduct of one’s life realistic?
• Do you believe the controls against the abuse of power by a single government department have been effective?
• Does the federal government equally serve majority and minority interests today?
• Is there a role for states anymore?

Depending on student content vocabulary readiness the teacher may need to review vocabulary used in Federalist 51. A teacher resource has been created using the Federalist 51 summary to review vocabulary using a word wall. The teacher will tell students that the class will be adding several words to the word wall today. Word walls are a literacy strategy that may be used before reading (explicit teaching and modeling, during reading (guided practice) and after reading (guided practice). 

Activity 3: Discussing and Evaluating Federalist 51

Time required for activity: One 45 minute class period

After completing the guided reading handout on Federalist 51 , students will evaluate the effectiveness of Madison in communicating to the public the rationale for a) separate branches of government, b) legislative checks and balances in the same level of government, c) a compound republic or a division of powers between the general government and state governments and (d) a multiplicity of interests and sects in society.

Students will eventually have to list and defend ten words that Madison should prominently use to communicate the main ideas of Federalist 51 (see Assessment). To assist students in preparing for the assessment, students will participate in a Socratic seminar. Students will use their guided reading graphic organizer completed in Activity 2 to prepare for the Socratic seminar. See the handout to learn more about Socratic seminar.

The basic procedure for a Socratic seminar follows:

• Students should receive text that they will use for the Socratic seminar and should read, analyze, and take notes on the text.
• During class, students are randomly divided into two concentric circles: an inner circle and an outer circle.
• The students in the inner circle are posed with a question and then engage in a discussion of the text in the context of the question for approximately ten minutes, while students in the outer circle silently observe the behavior and performance of the inner circle.
• After the discussion of the text, the outer circle assesses the inner circle’s performance and gives ten minutes of feedback for the inner circle.
• Students in the inner and outer circles now exchange roles and positions.
• The new inner circle holds a ten-minute discussion using the same questions and then receives ten minutes of feedback from the new outer circle.

During the Socratic seminar students should make sure they do the following:

• Speak loudly and clearly
• Cite reasons and evidence for their statements
• Use the text to find support
• Listen to others respectfully
• Stick with the subject
• Talk to each other, not just to the leader
• Paraphrase accurately
• Ask for help to clear up confusion
• Support each other
• Avoid hostile exchanges
• Question others in a civil manner
• Be prepared

Suggested text students may respond to for the Socratic seminar follow. Madison uses several “key phrases” in Federalist 51 to encourage and persuade the public to support the signing of the Constitution. Consider how the phrases below were used to gain public support:

Text #1 to respond to: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

Text #2 to respond to: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”

Text #3 to respond to: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”

Text #4 to respond to: “But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”

Text #5 to respond to: “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”

Text #6 to respond to: “In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”

Text #7 to respond to: “This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.”

Text #8 to respond to: “In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government.”

See the Socratic seminar rubric handout and observation form to assess students during the Socratic seminar.

Depending on student content vocabulary readiness the teacher may need to review vocabulary used in Federalist 51 . Teachers can remind students to refer to the word wall during the Socratic seminar.

Assessment:

After you have studied the essay, Federalist 51, list the top 10 words you would encourage Madison to use in his writing to influence the public to ratify the Constitution. Briefly explain the importance of each word to reinforce the main ideas Madison was trying to stress in Federalist 51. Explanation for each word should be 3-5 sentences in length. Students should consider in their responses how the rights of the people can be protected from government.

Extending the Lesson:

Extension 1: List the top 10 words you would encourage Antifederalists to use in their writing to influence the public to not ratify the Constitution. Briefly explain the importance of each word to oppose the main ideas Madison was trying to stress in Federalist 51. Explanation for each word should be 3-5 sentences in length.

Related EDSITEment Lesson Plans:

• The Federalist Debates: Balancing Power between State and Federal Governments

Selected EDSITEment Websites:

• James Madison, Federalist 10
• James Madison, Federalist 51

Standards Alignment:

• CIVICED (9-12) I What are Civic Life, Politics, and Government?
• CIVICED (9-12) II What are the Foundations of the American Political System?
• CIVICED (9-12) III How Does the Government Established by the Constitution Embody the Purposes, Values, and Principles of American Democracy?
• CIVICED (9-12) V What are the Roles of the Citizen in American Democracy?
• NCSS-10 Civic ideals and practices. Citizenship in a democratic republic.
• NCSS-4 Individual development and identity.
• NCSS-5 Individuals, groups, and institutions.
• NCSS-6 Power, authority, and governance.

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