thesis statement of korean war

• AsianStudies.org
• Annual Conference
• EAA Articles
• 2025 Annual Conference March 13-16, 2025
• AAS Community Forum Log In and Participate

Education About Asia: Online Archives

The korean war 101: causes, course, and conclusion of the conflict.

North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, igniting the Korean War. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of US leaders, who instantly concluded that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had ordered the invasion as the first step in his plan for world conquest. “Communism,” President Harry S. Truman argued later in his memoirs, “was acting in Korea just as [Adolf] Hitler, [Benito] Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.” If North Korea’s aggression went “unchallenged, the world was certain to be plunged into another world war.” This 1930s history lesson prevented Truman from recognizing that the origins of this conflict dated to at least the start of World War II, when Korea was a colony of Japan. Liberation in August 1945 led to division and a predictable war because the US and the Soviet Union would not allow the Korean people to decide their own future.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely indifferent to its fate.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely in- different to its fate. But after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors acknowledged at once the importance of this strategic peninsula for peace in Asia, advocating a postwar trusteeship to achieve Korea’s independence. Late in 1943, Roosevelt joined British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek in signing the Cairo Declaration, stating that the Allies “are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Stalin endorsed a four-power trusteeship in Korea. When Harry S. Truman became president after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, however, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. An atomic attack on Japan, Truman thought, would preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific War and allow unilateral American occupation of Korea. His gamble failed. On August 8, Stalin declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Stalin’s acceptance of Truman’s eleventh-hour proposal to divide the peninsula into So- viet and American zones of military occupation at the thirty-eighth parallel saved Korea from unification under Communist rule.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary.

US military occupation of southern Korea began on September 8, 1945. With very little preparation, Washing- ton redeployed the XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa to Korea. US occupation officials, ignorant of Korea’s history and culture, quickly had trouble maintaining order because al- most all Koreans wanted immediate in- dependence. It did not help that they followed the Japanese model in establishing an authoritarian US military government. Also, American occupation officials relied on wealthy land- lords and businessmen who could speak English for advice. Many of these citizens were former Japanese collaborators and had little interest in ordinary Koreans’ reform demands. Meanwhile, Soviet military forces in northern Korea, after initial acts of rape, looting, and petty crime, implemented policies to win popular support. Working with local people’s committees and indigenous Communists, Soviet officials enacted sweeping political, social, and economic changes. They also expropriated and punished landlords and collaborators, who fled southward and added to rising distress in the US zone. Simultaneously, the Soviets ignored US requests to coordinate occupation policies and allow free traffic across the parallel.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary. This became clear when the US and the Soviet Union tried to implement a revived trusteeship plan after the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Eighteen months of intermittent bilateral negotiations in Korea failed to reach agreement on a representative group of Koreans to form a provisional government, primarily because Moscow refused to consult with anti-Communist politicians opposed to trustee- ship. Meanwhile, political instability and economic deterioration in southern Korea persisted, causing Hodge to urge withdrawal. Postwar US demobilization that brought steady reductions in defense spending fueled pressure for disengagement. In September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added weight to the withdrawal argument when they advised that Korea held no strategic significance. With Communist power growing in China, however, the Truman administration was unwilling to abandon southern Korea precipitously, fearing domestic criticism from Republicans and damage to US credibility abroad.

Seeking an answer to its dilemma, the US referred the Korean dispute to the United Nations, which passed a resolution late in 1947 calling for internationally supervised elections for a government to rule a united Korea. Truman and his advisors knew the Soviets would refuse to cooper- ate. Discarding all hope for early reunification, US policy by then had shifted to creating a separate South Korea, able to defend itself. Bowing to US pressure, the United Nations supervised and certified as valid obviously undemocratic elections in the south alone in May 1948, which resulted in formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August. The Soviet Union responded in kind, sponsoring the creation of the Democratic People’s Re- public of Korea (DPRK) in September. There now were two Koreas, with President Syngman Rhee installing a repressive, dictatorial, and anti-Communist regime in the south, while wartime guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung imposed the totalitarian Stalinist model for political, economic, and social development on the north. A UN resolution then called for Soviet-American withdrawal. In December 1948, the Soviet Union, in response to the DPRK’s request, removed its forces from North Korea.

South Korea’s new government immediately faced violent opposition, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion. Despite plans to leave the south by the end of 1948, Truman delayed military withdrawal until June 29, 1949. By then, he had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, undertaking a commitment to train, equip, and supply an ROK security force capable of maintaining internal order and deterring a DPRK attack. In spring 1949, US military advisors supervised a dramatic improvement in ROK army fighting abilities. They were so successful that militant South Korean officers began to initiate assaults northward across the thirty-eighth parallel that summer. These attacks ignited major border clashes with North Korean forces. A kind of war was already underway on the peninsula when the conventional phase of Korea’s conflict began on June 25, 1950. Fears that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve reunification explain why the Truman administration limited ROK military capabilities, withholding tanks, heavy artillery, and warplanes.

Pursuing qualified containment in Korea, Truman asked Congress for three-year funding of economic aid to the ROK in June 1949. To build sup- port for its approval, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Ache- son’s speech to the National Press Club depicted an optimistic future for South Korea. Six months later, critics charged that his exclusion of the ROK from the US “defensive perimeter” gave the Communists a “green light” to launch an invasion. However, Soviet documents have established that Acheson’s words had almost no impact on Communist invasion planning. Moreover, by June 1950, the US policy of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be experiencing marked success. The ROK had acted vigorously to control spiraling inflation, and Rhee’s opponents won legislative control in May elections. As important, the ROK army virtually eliminated guerrilla activities, threatening internal order in South Korea, causing the Truman administration to propose a sizeable military aid increase. Now optimistic about the ROK’s prospects for survival, Washington wanted to deter a conventional attack from the north.

Stalin worried about South Korea’s threat to North Korea’s survival. Throughout 1949, he consistently refused to approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Communist victory in China in fall 1949 pressured Stalin to show his support for a similar Korean outcome. In January 1950, he and Kim discussed plans for an invasion in Moscow, but the Soviet dictator was not ready to give final consent. How- ever, he did authorize a major expansion of the DPRK’s military capabilities. At an April meeting, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular uprising against Rhee’s regime. Still fearing US military intervention, Stalin informed Kim that he could invade only if Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to gain the consent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Significantly, Mao also voiced concern that the Americans would defend the ROK but gave his reluctant approval as well. Kim Il Sung’s patrons had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On the morning of June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched its military offensive to conquer South Korea. Rather than immediately committing ground troops, Truman’s first action was to approve referral of the matter to the UN Security Council because he hoped the ROK military could defend itself with primarily indirect US assistance. The UN Security Council’s first resolution called on North Korea to accept a cease- fire and withdraw, but the KPA continued its advance. On June 27, a second resolution requested that member nations provide support for the ROK’s defense. Two days later, Truman, still optimistic that a total commitment was avoidable, agreed in a press conference with a newsman’s description of the conflict as a “police action.” His actions reflected an existing policy that sought to block Communist expansion in Asia without using US military power, thereby avoiding increases in defense spending. But early on June 30, he reluctantly sent US ground troops to Korea after General Douglas MacArthur, US Occupation commander in Japan, advised that failure to do so meant certain Communist destruction of the ROK.

Kim Il Sung’s patrons [Stalin and Mao] had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Command (UNC) and called on Truman to appoint a UNC commander. The president immediately named MacArthur, who was required to submit periodic reports to the United Nations on war developments. The ad- ministration blocked formation of a UN committee that would have direct access to the UNC commander, instead adopting a procedure whereby MacArthur received instructions from and reported to the JCS. Fifteen members joined the US in defending the ROK, but 90 percent of forces were South Korean and American with the US providing weapons, equipment, and logistical support. Despite these American commitments, UNC forces initially suffered a string of defeats. By July 20, the KPA shattered five US battalions as it advanced one hundred miles south of Seoul, the ROK capital. Soon, UNC forces finally stopped the KPA at the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula.

On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea

Despite the UNC’s desperate situation during July, MacArthur developed plans for a counteroffensive in coordination with an amphibious landing behind enemy lines allowing him to “compose and unite” Korea. State Department officials began to lobby for forcible reunification once the UNC assumed the offensive, arguing that the US should destroy the KPA and hold free elections for a government to rule a united Korea. The JCS had grave doubts about the wisdom of landing at the port of Inchon, twenty miles west of Seoul, because of narrow access, high tides, and sea- walls, but the September 15 operation was a spectacular success. It allowed the US Eighth Army to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and advance north to unite with the X Corps, liberating Seoul two weeks later and sending the KPA scurrying back into North Korea. A month earlier, the administration had abandoned its initial war aim of merely restoring the status quo. On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea.

Invading the DPRK was an incredible blunder that transformed a three-month war into one lasting three years. US leaders had realized that extension of hostilities risked Soviet or Chinese entry, and therefore, NSC- 81 included the precaution that only Korean units would move into the most northern provinces. On October 2, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene in Korea if US forces crossed the parallel, but US officials thought he was bluffing. The UNC offensive began on October 7, after UN passage of a resolution authorizing MacArthur to “ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.” At a meeting at Wake Island on October 15, MacArthur assured Truman that China would not enter the war, but Mao already had decided to intervene after concluding that Beijing could not tolerate US challenges to its regional credibility. He also wanted to repay the DPRK for sending thou- sands of soldiers to fight in the Chinese civil war. On August 5, Mao instructed his northeastern military district commander to prepare for operations in Korea in the first ten days of September. China’s dictator then muted those associates opposing intervention.

On October 19, units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under the command of General Peng Dehuai crossed the Yalu River. Five days later, MacArthur ordered an offensive to China’s border with US forces in the vanguard. When the JCS questioned this violation of NSC-81, MacArthur replied that he had discussed this action with Truman on Wake Island. Having been wrong in doubting Inchon, the JCS remained silent this time. Nor did MacArthur’s superiors object when he chose to retain a divided command. Even after the first clash between UNC and CPV troops on October 26, the general remained supremely confident. One week later, the Chinese sharply attacked advancing UNC and ROK forces. In response, MacArthur ordered air strikes on Yalu bridges without seeking Washing- ton’s approval. Upon learning this, the JCS prohibited the assaults, pending Truman’s approval. MacArthur then asked that US pilots receive permission for “hot pursuit” of enemy aircraft fleeing into Manchuria. He was infuriated upon learning that the British were advancing a UN proposal to halt the UNC offensive well short of the Yalu to avert war with China, viewing the measure as appeasement.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his “Home-by-Christmas Offensive.” The next day, the CPV counterattacked en masse, sending UNC forces into a chaotic retreat southward and causing the Truman administration immediately to consider pursuing a Korean cease-fire. In several public pronouncements, MacArthur blamed setbacks not on himself but on unwise command limitations. In response, Truman approved a directive to US officials that State Department approval was required for any comments about the war. Later that month, MacArthur submitted a four- step “Plan for Victory” to defeat the Communists—a naval blockade of China’s coast, authorization to bombard military installations in Manchuria, deployment of Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist forces in Korea, and launching of an attack on mainland China from Taiwan. The JCS, despite later denials, considered implementing these actions before receiving favorable battlefield reports.

Early in 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, new commander of the US Eighth Army, halted the Communist southern advance. Soon, UNC counterattacks restored battle lines north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In March, MacArthur, frustrated by Washington’s refusal to escalate the war, issued a demand for immediate surrender to the Communists that sabotaged a planned cease-fire initiative. Truman reprimanded but did not recall the general. On April 5, House Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr. read MacArthur’s letter in Congress, once again criticizing the administration’s efforts to limit the war. Truman later argued that this was the “last straw.” On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the president fired MacArthur, justifying his action as a defense of the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military, but another consideration may have exerted even greater influence on Truman. The JCS had been monitoring a Communist military buildup in East Asia and thought a trusted UNC commander should have standing authority to retaliate against Soviet or Chinese escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons that they had deployed to forward Pacific bases. Truman and his advisors, as well as US allies, distrusted MacArthur, fearing that he might provoke an incident to widen the war.

MacArthur’s recall ignited a firestorm of public criticism against both Truman and the war. The general returned to tickertape parades and, on April 19, 1951, he delivered a televised address before a joint session of Congress, defending his actions and making this now-famous assertion: “In war there is no substitute for victory.” During Senate joint committee hearings on his firing in May, MacArthur denied that he was guilty of in- subordination. General Omar N. Bradley, the JCS chair, made the administration’s case, arguing that enacting MacArthur’s proposals would lead to “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” Meanwhile, in April, the Communists launched the first of two major offensives in a final effort to force the UNC off the peninsula. When May ended, the CPV and KPA had suffered huge losses, and a UNC counteroffensive then restored the front north of the parallel, persuading Beijing and Pyongyang, as was already the case in Washington, that pursuit of a cease-fire was necessary. The belligerents agreed to open truce negotiations on July 10 at Kaesong, a neutral site that the Communists deceitfully occupied on the eve of the first session.

North Korea and China created an acrimonious atmosphere with at- tempts at the outset to score propaganda points, but the UNC raised the first major roadblock with its proposal for a demilitarized zone extending deep into North Korea. More important, after the talks moved to Panmunjom in October, there was rapid progress in resolving almost all is- sues, including establishment of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines, truce enforcement inspection procedures, and a postwar political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification. An armistice could have been concluded ten months after talks began had the negotiators not deadlocked over the disposition of prisoners of war (POWs). Rejecting the UNC proposal for non-forcible repatriation, the Communists demanded adherence to the Geneva Convention that required return of all POWs. Beijing and Pyongyang were guilty of hypocrisy regarding this matter because they were subjecting UNC prisoners to unspeakable mistreatment and indoctrination.

On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the presi- dent fired MacArthur.

Truman ordered that the UNC delegation assume an inflexible stand against returning Communist prisoners to China and North Korea against their will. “We will not buy an armistice,” he insisted, “by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.” Although Truman unquestionably believed in the moral rightness of his position, he was not unaware of the propaganda value derived from Communist prisoners defecting to the “free world.” His advisors, however, withheld evidence from him that contradicted this assessment. A vast majority of North Korean POWs were actually South Koreans who either joined voluntarily or were impressed into the KPA. Thousands of Chinese POWs were Nationalist soldiers trapped in China at the end of the civil war, who now had the chance to escape to Taiwan. Chinese Nationalist guards at UNC POW camps used terrorist “re-education” tactics to compel prisoners to refuse repatriation; resisters risked beatings or death, and repatriates were even tattooed with anti- Communist slogans.

In November 1952, angry Americans elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president, in large part because they expected him to end what had be- come the very unpopular “Mr. Truman’s War.” Fulfilling a campaign pledge, the former general visited Korea early in December, concluding that further ground attacks would be futile. Simultaneously, the UN General Assembly called for a neutral commission to resolve the dispute over POW repatriation. Instead of embracing the plan, Eisenhower, after taking office in January 1953, seriously considered threatening a nuclear attack on China to force a settlement. Signaling his new resolve, Eisenhower announced on February 2 that he was ordering removal of the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, implying endorsement for a Nationalist assault on the mainland. What influenced China more was the devastating impact of the war. By summer 1952, the PRC faced huge domestic economic problems and likely decided to make peace once Truman left office. Major food shortages and physical devastation persuaded Pyongyang to favor an armistice even earlier.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953.

Early in 1953, China and North Korea were prepared to resume the truce negotiations, but the Communists preferred that the Americans make the first move. That came on February 22 when the UNC, repeating a Red Cross proposal, suggested exchanging sick and wounded prisoners. At this key moment, Stalin died on March 5. Rather than dissuading the PRC and the DPRK as Stalin had done, his successors encouraged them to act on their desire for peace. On March 28, the Communist side accepted the UNC proposal. Two days later, Zhou Enlai publicly proposed transfer of prisoners rejecting repatriation to a neutral state. On April 20, Operation Little Switch, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, began, and six days later, negotiations resumed at Panmunjom. Sharp disagreement followed over the final details of the truce agreement. Eisenhower insisted later that the PRC accepted US terms after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed India’s prime minister in May that without progress toward a truce, the US would terminate the existing limitations on its conduct of the war. No documentary evidence has of yet surfaced to support his assertion.

Also, by early 1953, both Washington and Beijing clearly wanted an armistice, having tired of the economic burdens, military losses, political and military constraints, worries about an expanded war, and pressure from allies and the world community to end the stalemated conflict. A steady stream of wartime issues threatened to inflict irrevocable damage on US relations with its allies in Western Europe and nonaligned members of the United Nations. Indeed, in May 1953, US bombing of North Korea’s dams and irrigation system ignited an outburst of world criticism. Later that month and early in June, the CPV staged powerful attacks against ROK defensive positions. Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus displayed its continuing resolve, using military means to persuade its adversary to make concessions on the final terms. Before the belligerents could sign the agreement, Rhee tried to torpedo the impending truce when he released 27,000 North Korean POWs. Eisenhower bought Rhee’s acceptance of a cease-fire with pledges of financial aid and a mutual security pact.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953. Since then, Koreans have seen the war as the second-greatest tragedy in their recent history after Japanese colonial rule. Not only did it cause devastation and three million deaths, it also confirmed the division of a homogeneous society after thirteen centuries of unity, while permanently separating millions of families. Meanwhile, US wartime spending jump-started Japan’s economy, which led to its emergence as a global power. Koreans instead had to endure the living tragedy of yearning for reunification, as diplomatic tension and military clashes along the demilitarized zone continued into the twenty-first century.

Korea’s war also dramatically reshaped world affairs. In response, US leaders vastly increased defense spending, strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for rearming West Germany. In Asia, the conflict saved Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, while making South Korea a long-term client of the US. US relations with China were poisoned for twenty years, especially after Washington persuaded the United Nations to condemn the PRC for aggression in Korea. Ironically, the war helped Mao’s regime consolidate its control in China, while elevating its regional prestige. In response, US leaders, acting on what they saw as Korea’s primary lesson, relied on military means to meet the challenge, with disastrous results in Việt Nam.

Share this:

• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)

SUGGESTED RESOURCES

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean Conflict . Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.

“Korea: Lessons of the Forgotten War.” YouTube video, 2:20, posted by KRT Productions Inc., 2000. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fi31OoQfD7U.

Lee, Steven Hugh. The Korean War. New York: Longman, 2001.

Matray, James I. “Korea’s War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature.” Cold War History 11, no. 1 (February 2011): 99–129.

US Department of Defense. Korea 1950–1953, accessed July 9, 2012, http://koreanwar.defense.gov/index.html.

• Latest News
• Join or Renew
• Education About Asia
• Education About Asia Articles
• Asia Shorts Book Series
• Asia Past & Present
• Key Issues in Asian Studies
• Journal of Asian Studies
• The Bibliography of Asian Studies
• AAS-Gale Fellowship
• Council Grants
• Book Prizes
• Graduate Student Paper Prizes
• Distinguished Contributions to Asian Studies Award
• First Book Subvention Program
• External Grants & Fellowships
• AAS Career Center
• Asian Studies Programs & Centers
• Study Abroad Programs
• Language Database
• Conferences & Events
• #AsiaNow Blog

Throughout May, AAS is celebrating Asian American and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander Heritage Month. Read more

The Korean War: 1950-1953 Essay

Introduction, works cited.

The Second World War marked the starting of the Korea predicament. According to SparkNotes, the 1950-1953 war started when the South Koreans, who were non communists, were attacked by the communist army of North Korea. This is when the Allies were assigned to take over the Korean cape that was previously engaged by Japan.

It is during the 38 th parallel that the Korean responsibility was divided between the Soviet Union and the United States. According to the Australian War Memorial, the years that followed saw the Soviet Union promote a tough collective administration in the north, while in the south, the government received support from the US. Anxiety rose by the mid 1950 amid the two regions, with each one of them being governed by a different government, up to the position where each one of the aggressive armies was reinforcing along the boundary.

On 25 of June 1950, the army of the North Korea lastly made its way into the southern region, and proceeded towards Seoul, the capital (Turner Publishing Company 15). In a period that was less than seven days, the city fell. This saw the North Korean military precede their way to the south, towards the significant Pusan port, deliberately.

In two days time, South Korea received support from the US which included both sea and air. According to SparkNotes, the Security Council of the United Nations requested for all its members to help in repelling molest by the North Koreans. This received a good response as troops, medical squads, aircraft, and ships, were offered by twenty one countries.

According to Australian War Memorial, Australia offered the Australian Royal Regiment, 77 RAAF Squadron, and the 3 rd Battalion. During this point in time, both of them were located in Japan where they formed a component of the Occupation Force of the British Commonwealth.

SparkNotes records that, United States did not consider Korea as of strategic importance, but at this period, the Cold War political environment was one that would define that policy makers were tough on communism. Technically, the intervention by the US was in form of police action that was managed by a peace keeping force of the United Nations. In reality, the US and the anti communists of NATO were maneuvering the UN to suit their own interests (Poulantzas 332).

The Inchon attack

In September 1950, while the US, the South Korean, and the UN armies stuck beside the sea at Pusan, Spaknotes records that, a bold amphibious attack was coordinated by Douglas C. McArthur on Inchon. This is a port located on Koreas Western coast. MacArthur, who used to be the Southwest Pacific commander during the Second World War, oversaw Japan’s occupation period after war. He also was in charge of the UN army in the early stages of the war in Korea.

With this accomplishment, McArthur evoked the South Korea capital, Seoul, through a pincer progress thereby overwhelming the North Korea army which by then was attacking Pusan (Poulantzas 331). He did not get contented with this fast mission he made on South Korea, but with the help of the US, he traversed the 38 th parallel. He chased the North Korean forces up to the North Korea northern most provinces (Poulantzas 332).

Chinese Intrusion

Scared, an army was clandestinely sent by the China Republic across River Yalu (Poulantzas 331). This is because the China Republic thought that US wanted to use North Korea to fight Manchuria. The Chinese force assaulted the US, the South Korea, and the UN armies. As of Australian War Memorial, when Lt. General Mathew Ridgway was appointed as the ground forces commander, there was progress in the American spirits, making the proposal to sway against the Chinese Communists’.

The Sack of McArthur

With the hope of ending the war fast, President Truman had to dismiss MacArthur as he did not oblige to his orders (Sweeney and Byrne 245). The president wanted him to be more diplomatic, but McArthur, the bright strategist, persisted, issuing provocative lines of his wishes of bringing together Korea.

According to SparkNotes, with the help of the Joint Staff Chiefs, the president was able to remove McArthur from authority. Though the decision was detested by Americans as McArthur was considered an admired war hero, the support of the Joint Staff Chiefs is the one that saved the president from prosecution after the dismissal.

Ridgway as the commander

As per Australian War Memorial, Ridgway held the position of the commander, and avoided the communists with strong defenses and entrenchments, immediate the 38 th parallel north. This is by sending occasional insults against the iron triangle, which was the enactment area for assaults meant for South Korea.

SparkNotes notes that, in the years 1951 and 1952, peace dialogues pulled at Kaesong, then made their way at Panmunjom. Through strategic bombing, the US attempted to frighten the communists into making dialogues of a peace accord, but they refused to move, mainly on the Prisoner of War matter repatriation ((Turner Publishing Company 13).

Both sides wanted to emerge strong making the talks to continue, sometimes stopping for months. This is because the Communists alleged that they were insulted by Mathew Ridgeway, and were demanding for an apology.

According to Australian War Memorial, the negotiations were resumed on October, but the location was changed to Panmunjom. Merely after a war hero, Eisenhower, who did not fear republican disapproval became president, the US formed ample compromises to the communists.

A peace agreement was marked on 27 July1953 at Panmunjom, after seventeen negotiation days, bringing to an end the war in Korea, which lasted for two years (Turner Publishing Company 12).This brought back Korea to a split position, essentially to similar as it was, prior to the war. Both the war and its effect did not contribute to the reduction of the anxiety that was there in the Cold War period.

The war created a crisis in Korea as it destroyed most of the country’s industrial plants. Regardless of the hydroelectric and mineral wealth found in North Korea, the region ended up in poverty, and could not afford to catch up with the financial rate of South Korea.

According to SparkNotes, this made South Korea to be four times the gross domestic product of North Korea. However, North Korea stayed quite sovereign of PRC and USSR authority. Actually, Chinese and Soviet wrangling over the one supposed to settle the bill for the war in Korea was one aspect in the Sino-Soviet Split, obvious soon after the cold war.

The Korean War was a depressing occurrence for the US. This is because it was the first war in which the US involved itself in and lost (Sweeney and Byrne 245). The war which claimed a total of 4 million lives including 50,000 of the US soldiers showed the US that, though it was able to come out of the Second World War as a powerful country, it was unable to firmly and imminently achieve its will and desires. Through this ending, America was able to improve and harden the Cold War policy for its future (Sweeney and Byrne 245).

Australian War Memorial. Korean War 1950-53. 2011. Web.

Poulantzas, Nicholas, M. The right of hot pursuit in international law . Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002. Print.

SparkNotes. The Korean War (1950-1953). 2011. Web.

Sweeney, Jerry, K., and Byrne, Kevin, B. A handbook of American military history: from the Revolutionary War to the present. Lincoln, NE: U of Nebraska Press, 2006. Print.

Turner Publishing Company. Strike Swiftly Korea 1950-1953: 70 th Heavy Tank Battalion . Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing Company, 1988.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2023, December 11). The Korean War: 1950-1953. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/

"The Korean War: 1950-1953." IvyPanda , 11 Dec. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'The Korean War: 1950-1953'. 11 December.

IvyPanda . 2023. "The Korean War: 1950-1953." December 11, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Korean War: 1950-1953." December 11, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Korean War: 1950-1953." December 11, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

• Tribal Recognition by the U.S Government Since 1953
• Leaders and Managers: The Difference
• Critical Issues in Philippine Relations
• New and Old Wars Comparison
• War, Its Definition, History and Aspects
• Wars in Modern Arab history
• Why Did Conflicts in Yugoslavia Lead to War in the 1990s?
• Iraqi invasion to Kuwait

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

Korean War, a ‘Forgotten’ Conflict That Shaped the Modern World

By Liam Stack

• Jan. 1, 2018

The Korean War has been called “the Forgotten War” in the United States, where coverage of the 1950s conflict was censored and its memory decades later is often overshadowed by World War II and the Vietnam War.

But the three-year conflict in Korea, which pitted communist and capitalist forces against each other, set the stage for decades of tension among North Korea, South Korea and the United States.

It also helped set the tone for Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War, profoundly shaping the world we live in today, historians said.

As tensions between North Korea and the United States continue to mount amid missile tests and taunts, here is a brief guide to the Korean War and the impacts that linger more than 60 years after its end.

How did the Korean War start?

The Korean War began when North Korean troops pushed into South Korea on June 25, 1950, and it lasted until 1953. But experts said the military conflict could not be properly understood without considering its historical context.

Korea, a Japanese colony from 1910 until 1945, was occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The United States proposed temporarily dividing the country along the 38th Parallel as a way to maintain its influence on the peninsula, which bordered Russia, said Charles K. Armstrong, a professor of Korean history at Columbia University.

“A divided Korea was something unprecedented,” he said.

But the divide lasted in part because of competing visions among Koreans for the country’s future. “Fundamentally it was a civil war, fought over issues going back into Korea’s colonial experience,” said Bruce Cumings, a professor of history at the University of Chicago.

In 1948, the American-backed, anti-communist southern administration, based in Seoul, declared itself the Republic of Korea. It was led by Syngman Rhee, who lived in exile in the United States for many years and was installed as the South Korean leader by the Office of Strategic Services, a predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency, Professor Cumings said.

Soon after, the Soviet-backed, communist northern administration, based in Pyongyang, declared itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Its leader was Kim Il-sung, who fought alongside communist forces during the Chinese civil war and was the grandfather of North Korea’s current dictator, Kim Jong-un.

Each regime was unstable, rejected the legitimacy of the other and considered itself to be Korea’s sole rightful ruler. Border skirmishes between the two were frequent before the Korean War began.

Who were the combatants?

The war pitted South Korea and the United States, fighting under the auspices of the United Nations, against North Korea and China.

Other nations contributed troops, too, but American forces did most of the fighting. “The South Korean Army virtually collapsed” at the start of the war, Professor Cumings said.

The Soviet Union supported North Korea at the beginning of the war, giving it arms, tanks and strategic advice. But China soon emerged as its most important ally, sending soldiers to fight in Korea as a way to keep the conflict away from its border.

The Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, also saw China’s participation in the war as a way to thank Korean Communists who fought in the Chinese civil war, Professor Cumings said.

“There was a lot of field contact between American and Chinese forces,” Professor Armstrong said. “In a sense, this was the first and only war between China and the United States, so far.”

How damaging was it?

The war devastated Korea. Historians said that between three million and four million people were killed, although firm figures have never been produced, particularly by the North Korean government. As many as 70 percent of the dead may have been civilians.

Destruction was particularly acute in the North, which was subjected to years of American bombing, including with napalm. Roughly 25 percent of its prewar population was killed, Professor Cumings said, and many of the survivors lived underground by the war’s end.

“North Korea was flattened,” he said. “The North Koreans see the American bombing as a Holocaust, and every child is taught about it.”

Damage was also widespread in South Korea, where Seoul changed hands four times. But most combat took place in the northern or central parts of the peninsula around the current Demilitarized Zone, which divides the countries, Professor Cumings said.

How did it end?

Technically, the Korean War did not end.

The fighting stopped when North Korea, China and the United States reached an armistice in 1953. But South Korea did not agree to the armistice, and no formal peace treaty was ever signed.

“There is still a technical state of war between the combatants,” Professor Cumings said.

Neither North nor South Korea had achieved its goal: the destruction of the opposing regime and reunification of the divided peninsula.

Since 1953 there has been an uneasy coexistence between North and South Korea, which hosts over 20,000 American troops. At one time hundreds of American nuclear weapons were based there.

“It was from the Korean War onward that we had a permanent, global American military presence that we had never had before,” Professor Armstrong said. Other countries that host American troops include Qatar, Japan, Italy and Germany. “It was a real turning point for America’s global role.”

In the decades after the war, South Korea transformed into an economic powerhouse. Professor Cumings said many of its citizens now know little about the conflict and have “a fatalistic orientation” toward the economically isolated North.

Meanwhile, North Korea became “the world’s most amazing garrison state with the fourth largest army in the world.”

“Its generals are still fighting the war,” Professor Cumings said. “For them it has never ended.”

Home — Essay Samples — War — Korean War

Essays on Korean War

Korean war essay topics and outline examples, essay title 1: the korean war (1950-1953): uncovering the origins, cold war context, and global implications.

Thesis Statement: This essay delves into the complex origins of the Korean War, the Cold War context that fueled the conflict, and the far-reaching global implications of the war, including its impact on international alliances and the division of Korea.

• Introduction
• Background and Historical Context: Pre-war Korea and Its Division
• The Cold War Setting: U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Proxy Wars
• The Outbreak of War: North Korea's Invasion and International Response
• The Course of the Conflict: Battles, Truce Talks, and Stalemate
• Global Implications: The Korean War's Impact on East Asia and International Relations
• Legacy and Repercussions: The Division of Korea and Ongoing Tensions

Essay Title 2: The Korean War's Forgotten Heroes: Examining the Role of United Nations Forces and the Armistice Agreement

Thesis Statement: This essay focuses on the often-overlooked contributions of United Nations forces in the Korean War, the complexities of the Armistice Agreement, and the enduring impact of the war on Korean society and international peacekeeping efforts.

• The United Nations Coalition: Multinational Forces in Korea
• The Armistice Negotiations: Challenges, Agreements, and Ongoing Tensions
• Forgotten Heroes: Stories of Courage and Sacrifice
• Korean War Veterans: Their Post-War Experiences and Commemoration
• Peacekeeping and Reconciliation Efforts: The Role of the United Nations
• Implications for Modern International Conflict Resolution

Essay Title 3: The Korean War and the Origins of the Cold War: Analyzing the Impact on U.S.-Soviet Relations and Global Alliances

Thesis Statement: This essay explores how the Korean War influenced U.S.-Soviet relations, the formation of military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the Cold War's evolution into a global struggle for influence.

• The Korean War as a Catalyst: Escalation of Cold War Tensions
• Military Alliances: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Globalization of the Cold War
• The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation: Proxy Warfare and Diplomatic Efforts
• International Response and Support for North and South Korea
• The Aftermath of the Korean War: Paving the Way for Future Cold War Conflicts
• Assessing the Korean War's Long-Term Impact on U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Korean War – a Conflict Between The Soviet Union and The United States

The local and global effects of the korean war, made-to-order essay as fast as you need it.

Each essay is customized to cater to your unique preferences

+ experts online

The Role of The Korean War in History

The origin of the korean conflict, the role of the battle of chipyong-ni in the korean war, the korean war and its impact on lawrence werner, let us write you an essay from scratch.

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Historical Accuracy of The Book Korean War by Maurice Isserman

Solutions for disputes and disloyalty, depiction of the end of the korean war in the film the front line, the impact of war on korea.

25 June, 1950 - 27 July, 1953

Korean Peninsula, Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, Korea Strait, China–North Korea border.

China, North Korea, South Korea, United Nations, United States

Korean War was a conflict between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in which at least 2.5 million persons lost their lives. The war reached international proportions in June 1950 when North Korea, supplied and advised by the Soviet Union, invaded the South.

North Korean invasion of South Korea repelled; US-led United Nations invasion of North Korea repelled; Chinese and North Korean invasion of South Korea repelled; Korean Armistice Agreement signed in 1953; Korean conflict ongoing.

Relevant topics

• Vietnam War
• Israeli Palestinian Conflict
• Syrian Civil War
• Nuclear Weapon
• The Spanish American War
• Atomic Bomb
• Treaty of Versailles

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

The Korean War and the Battle of Chosin Reservoir

Written by: Bill of Rights Institute

By the end of this section, you will:.

• Explain the continuities and changes in Cold War policies from 1945 to 1980

Suggested Sequencing

Use this narrative with the Truman Intervenes in Korea Decision Point, the Truman Fires General Douglas MacArthur Decision Point, and the Harry S. Truman, “Truman Doctrine” Address, March 1947 Primary Source to have students analyze the United States’ involvement in the conflict.

On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea and rapidly swept through the nation until it controlled all but a small perimeter around Pusan at the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula. President Harry Truman was concerned about containing Soviet expansion because of the Russian explosion of an atomic bomb and the fall of China to communism the year before. He secured an authorization of force from the United Nations rather than Congress because he considered his planned intervention in South Korea to be a “police action.” General Douglas MacArthur was named supreme commander of a U.N. coalition of forces led by the United States as the nation went to war.

The U.N. armies counterattacked the North Koreans and gained back much of the territory belonging to the South. On September 15, 1950, the First Marine Division under General Oliver Prince Smith made an amphibious landing at Inchon behind enemy lines and quickly took control of Seoul, the capital of South Korea, with the X Corps of the U.S. Army. Not satisfied with regaining South Korea, General MacArthur secured support from the U.N. and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and permission from President Truman to send American and allied troops past the 38th parallel and into North Korea.

On October 5, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warned that if U.N. troops crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea, China would intervene in the war. MacArthur shrugged off the warning, and U.N. forces took the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, two weeks later. MacArthur then sent his forces farther north in several columns toward the Yalu River, on the border with China.

The map shows the northern advance of U.N. forces past the 38th Parallel toward the Chinese border.

The plan was for the First Marine Division to push its way to the objective of the Yalu along the northeastern part of the peninsula, through the forbidding Taebaek Mountains and supported by the 1st Marine Air Wing and the 11th Artillery. MacArthur described the area as a “merciless wasteland . . . locked in a silent death grip of snow and ice.”

The Marines and Army troops sailed to Wonsan in North Korea, where they disembarked 100 miles north of the 38th parallel. General Smith opposed the plan to march through the Taebaeks because of the arctic temperatures, narrow roads vulnerable to ambush, and thin supply lines likely to be cut. He was also concerned about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military reports of contact with the Chinese, but MacArthur was unworried and urged the Marines forward.

From October 19 to 25, approximately 300,000 battle-hardened Chinese troops who had fought in the Chinese Civil War crossed the Yalu. The Chinese Ninth Army Group, 120,000 soldiers strong, swarmed into the Taebaeks. They camouflaged their movements by traveling at night and covering themselves with white sheets in the snow. The Chinese planned to use their numbers to overwhelm the Marines, who had superior firepower.

General Song Shilun, center, was the commander of the Chinese Ninth Army Group at Chosin, Korea, in 1950.

Just before midnight on November 2, the Chinese attacked the 3,000 Marines of the 7th Regiment under Colonel Homer Litzenberg at the village of Sudong, on the road to Hagaru-ri. The Chinese forces surged in human waves that were annihilated by Marine machine guns, rifles, and mortars. The Marines killed almost 1,000 Chinese and lost only 61 of their own. The enemy disappeared after the probing attack, having gained valuable information about the Marines’ capabilities as well as about U.S. and South Korean armies elsewhere in the area.

General Smith selected Hagaru-ri village as a forward base on the southeastern tip of the Chosin Reservoir. He ordered the artillery to deploy their batteries and the engineers to build an airstrip and supply depot. Smith sent Marines to cover East Hill, the heights overlooking the village. Marine infantrymen of the 7th Regiment Easy Company marched 14 miles to the northwest, to Hill 1282, which had a commanding view of the village of Yudam-ni. Fox Company was given the critical job of occupying a hill next to Toktong Pass, the only road linking Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni, so their fellow Marines could be supplied and would not be cut off. They arrived on November 27 and immediately started digging in, despite biting temperatures of ?25°F with strong winds.

The Fox Company Marines deployed in a horseshoe formation around the perimeter of the hill, anchored to a high embankment in the road. The front units laid out foxholes in a standard formation of two foxholes with one behind. Half the Marines went to sleep in heavy sleeping bags while the other half kept watch. They could not light fires because they had to hide their positions.

At 2:00 a.m., a large formation of Chinese in white uniforms attacked. They blew whistles and bugles and clanged cymbals, relying on sheer numbers rather than surprise. Soon, grenade explosions and machine-gun and rifle fire added to the deafening noise. There were so many Chinese that the Americans did not even aim their weapons. Within minutes, their American front-line positions were overrun and dozens were dead or wounded. Still, they fought back tenaciously.

Privates Hector Cafferata and Ken Benson were in a foxhole together when a grenade landed right on top of them. Benson grabbed it and it exploded in his face, temporarily blinding him. Cafferata fired a machine gun or rifle while Benson reloaded ammunition into empty weapons. Cafferata threw grenades as well and swung his shovel like a baseball bat to knock enemy grenades back down the hill. He was about to throw another one when it exploded in his hand and shredded his fingers. Nevertheless, he kept firing the weapons that Benson handed him. Captain William Barber rallied his troops at the top of the hill and moved among his men under fire to bolster their courage throughout the night.

The story was much the same on Hill 1282 at Yudam-ni, where Easy Company was under heavy attack all night and almost lost the hill until they counterattacked and gained a brief respite. They suffered significant casualties. East Hill on Hagaru-ri was beleaguered as well and barely held. U.S. Army units to the east of the reservoir and South Korean forces farther east were also hit hard during the first night. Chinese casualties totaled nearly 10,000 from these battles the first day.

As the sun rose over the rugged landscape, the exhausted Marines on Fox Hill counted 24 dead, 50 wounded, and three missing, cutting their effective strength by one-third. Captain Barber counted more than 450 enemy dead strewn all over the hill, with almost 100 in front of Cafferata and Benson’s foxhole. The extreme cold had clotted the bleeding from most of their wounds, but it also caused numerous cases of frostbite among the Marines. The soldiers helped the wounded and ate cold rations. Their spirits were lifted by support from airstrikes by Marine Corsairs and artillery barrages. In addition, cargo planes began dropping bundles of medical supplies, food, ammunition, radio batteries, and blankets.

The wounded from the battle at Fox Hill in Korea, 1950, were evacuated by plane to be helped elsewhere.

The Chinese, however, launched massive attacks during the next few nights. As the fighting grew desperate, dozens of wounded Marines in field hospitals gritted their teeth, grabbed a weapon, and straggled back to the fighting. One partially paralyzed man with his spine exposed from a gunshot wound tried to get up and fight but was stopped by a corpsman. Because the Marine Corps abided by the slogan, “Every Marine a rifleman,” cooks, mechanics, and drivers picked up weapons and entered the fray on the various hills.

This map shows the deployment of U.S. and Communist forces in the battle around the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. (credit: “Battle of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir” by Bill of Rights Institute/Flickr, CC BY 4.0)

By the morning of November 29, the Chinese had won control of East Hill and threatened Smith’s camp and airfield. As a result, Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller, commanding the First Regiment to the south at Koto-Ri, moved ahead toward Hagaru-ri with some British Royal Marines. The Chinese assaulted the allied relief column and knocked out vehicles on the narrow road, causing a deadly traffic jam. They killed more than 300 allies and took a few dozen survivors prisoner. The men in the rear could not get through and returned. About 400 men in the lead made it to the destination and successfully drove the Chinese from East Hill. They repulsed an attack that night and killed 1,500 Chinese soldiers. As a result of their valiant efforts, the airstrip was completed on December 1 and formed a vital link to the outside world, with cargo planes bringing in reinforcements and supplies and carrying out the wounded.

On December 3, the severely depleted companies of Marines at Yudam-ni sneaked their way back to Fox Hill led by Chinese-American Lieutenant Kurt Chew-Een Lee and helped relieve Fox Company. They subsequently became known as the “Ridgerunners.” Marine aircraft and artillery helped open the Toktong Pass as approximately 2,000 wounded Marines walked or were carried back to Hagaru-ri. As dusk settled, the bloody, ragged, unshaven, and unwashed Marines in tattered clothing marched into the base. One lieutenant colonel shouted to the men, “You people will now shape up and look sharp. We’re going in like United States Marines.” Everyone in the base stopped what they were doing and silently watched the proud men marching in perfect unison singing the Marines’ Hymn. The Army soldiers from east of the reservoir had been decimated and struggled back in smaller groups.

When asked about the retreat, General Smith retorted, “Retreat, hell! We’re just attacking in a different direction.” The entire division prepared to fight its way back to the coast, using airpower and artillery to pummel the Chinese, who had dug in around the main road and the bridge at Funchilin Pass, which they had blasted to prevent the American withdrawal. Marine engineers fixed the bridge, and the First Marine Division marched or rode back to the port of Hungnam to their transports for evacuation, especially for the wounded. Army General Ned Almond facilitated the humanitarian evacuation of 100,000 North Koreans to the south.

Pictured is a U.S. Army patrol moving from Chinhung-ni into Funchilin Pass on December 9, 1950.

The Marines suffered 750 dead and 3,000 wounded as they fought against the Chinese and caused more than 42,000 enemy casualties, costing the Chinese Ninth Army Group two divisions and effectively rendering it ineffective as a fighting force. The Chinese and North Koreans later drove the U.N. forces back down to the 38th parallel, where the war remained at a stalemate until peace was made in 1953. After World War II, some U.S. policy makers had wondered whether the Marines were necessary, but the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir changed their minds. Korea was one of the main battlegrounds of the early Cold War.

Review Questions

1. President Harry Truman was able to get approval for military action against the North Korean invasion of South Korea through the

• U.S. Senate
• U.S. Congress
• U.N. Security Council
• Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

2. The supreme commander of allied forces in South Korea was

• President Harry Truman
• General Douglas MacArthur
• General Oliver Prince Smith
• Homer Litzenberg

3. Which of the following battles has been labeled an ingenious military move by the American and allied forces that turned the tide of the Korean War?

4. Which nation issued a warning to American troops that it would expand the war if they were to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea?

• The Soviet Union
• North Korea

5. The main advantage the Chinese had over the American and British troops in the battles in northern Korea was

• superior weapons
• superior numbers
• better knowledge of the terrain
• the threat of atomic weapons

6. The result of the Korean War is best described as

• a victory for the North Koreans
• a victory for the United Nations troops
• a stalemate, because the resulting border was similar to that before the war
• worldwide compassion for the North Korean people

Free Response Questions

• Explain how the Korean War was part of the American policy of containment.
• Explain how the Chinese were able to push the United Nations troops back from the Yalu River.

AP Practice Questions

“The Security Council, Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of peace, Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to peace and security, Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”

United Nations Resolution 83, June 27, 1950

1. The sentiments expressed in this excerpt reflect a continuation of the policy of

• collective security
• human rights
• containment
• massive retaliation

2. The context surrounding the events described in the resolution was the

• end of World War II
• need for military alliances
• ending of the American blockade in east Asia

3. A similar circumstance in which America prevented a takeover by a communist government was the

• American occupation of Japan
• Normandy invasion
• Liberation of Manila in 1898
• Berlin Airlift

Primary Sources

“Chosin Reservoir, Korea. November-December 1950.” http://www.chosinreservoir.com/

Suggested Resources

Brands, H. W. The General Versus the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Doubleday, 2016.

Cleaver, Thomas McKelvey. The Frozen Chosen: The 1st Marine Division and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016.

Drury, Bob, and Tom Clavin. The Last Stand of Fox Company: A True Story of U.S. Marines in Combat. New York: Atlantic, 2009.

Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War . New York: Hyperion, 2007.

Hastings, Max. The Korean War . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Russ, Martin. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korean 1950 . New York: Penguin, 1999.

Sides, Hampton. On Desperate Ground: The Marines and the Reservoir, the Korean War’s Great Battle. New York: Doubleday, 2018.

Related Content

Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness

In our resource history is presented through a series of narratives, primary sources, and point-counterpoint debates that invites students to participate in the ongoing conversation about the American experiment.

• Essay Database
• world trade center
• Greek Food and Culture
• The Future Portrayed I…
• Intercultural Communications
• In Heart of Darkness, …
• Things Fall Apart by C…
• In J.M. Coetzee's Wait…
• The Criminals Of Profe…
• Socialization of Children
• The Poet of Nature, Wi…
• Leonhard Euler
• Articles of Confederat…
• About all Sharks
• Vietnam Poetry

The korean war.

What is paper-research.

• Custom Writing Service
• Terms of Service
• Privacy Policy
• Biographies

Comparison and Contrast of the Vietnam and Korean Wars

How Did the Cold War Affect U.S. Foreign Policy?

“I guess we’ve got no choice, but it scares the death out of me. I think everybody’s going to think, ‘we’re landing the Marines, we’re off to battle." - President Lyndon B. Johnson, 6 March 1965

Two major wars involved American military troops in the 1950s and 60s. In 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea, President Harry Truman responded by sending troops to aid South Korea. This required United Nations assistance to the American military conflicts. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sent additional troops to Vietnam to assist the South Vietnamese government from being overthrown by the North Vietnamese and disgruntled South Vietnamese citizens. Comparing the wars in Korea and Vietnam shows similarities and differences impacting each of the final outcomes based on conditions and motivations behind the wars.

Divided Countries Go to War

When these two wars began, both Korea and Vietnam were divided nations with communism entrenched in the northern parts of both countries and anticommunism in the southern areas. President Truman’s policy in North Korea resisted the spread of communism in favor of free societies that were attacked by armed minority factions or outside invaders. In Vietnam, President Johnson had to respond to conflicts in the Tonkin Gulf while also moving war efforts from initial American military conflicts intervention to full-scale American involvement.

Influences in Both Wars

The Russian and Chinese governments pushed North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung to invade South Korea and supplied troops and weapons when American forces responded to South Korea’s defense. Vietnam's war was predominately an internal civil war without external influence, except for a short period of time when China invaded in 1978. The American troops had difficulty determining friend from foe because many South Vietnamese sided with the North Vietnamese because the South Vietnamese government was corrupt.

Korean War vs. Vietnam War

The U.S. did not declare war on North Korea or North Vietnam. The U.S. responded to U.N. Security Council vote and quickly built up troops to aid South Korea under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In Vietnam, the U.S. had already supplied troops and advisers to South Vietnam when it was under French control. Johnson gradually supplied additional troops as they were needed. One goal in both conflicts was to prevent communist takeover of an anticommunist government. The "domino effect" premise proposed by Truman and later Kennedy was that if one government fell to communism that other countries in the area would follow.

One Strategy, Two Results

While there are similarities, how was the Vietnam War different than the Korean War? Both wars relied heavily on bombing from aircraft. American and U.N. allied troops bombed North Korea to such an extent that most cities, supply depots and industrial sites were destroyed. The North Korean government was plunged into financial and physical ruin to such an extent that the communist forces had to negotiate a peace settlement to survive the devastation. In Vietnam, the destruction from the air was not as severe. North and South Vietnamese troops were fighting the Americans in addition to troops from China. No front-line warfare occurred in Vietnam. Instead, guerrilla jungle warfare occurred as a military response that didn’t follow traditional military campaigns. The conflict strategies used in Korea were not effective in Vietnam.

No Victory Won

Looking closer at the conclusions of the two American military conflicts, the Korean War ended after three years and the U.S. continued to aid South Korea with troops, money and supplies. Neither side was defeated as both sides negotiated treaties to end the hostilities. Korea remained divided after the war while the Vietnam War lasted 10 years and wasn't one the U.S. ultimately could win. President Nixon withdrew troops as the war became more unpopular and it became obvious that North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Mihn would continue to fight until he drove the U.S. out of Vietnam. Ultimately, Vietnam reunited under communist rule.

Related Articles

Reasons for Massive U.S. Military Intervention in Vietnam

List of Political Factors During the Civil War

France's Involvement in the U.S. Civil War

What Happened to Korea After Japan Lost Control of It at the End of ...

What Did the US Do to Try and Stop the Civil War?

How Did Foreign Relations in the US Change After the Revolutionary ...

The Negative & Positive Consequences of the Korean War

What Did the USSR Do to Promote Communism in the Cold War?

• History: Korean War
• Time: How the Korean War Started
• History: Vietnam War
• Presidential Recordings Digital Edition: Lyndon B. Johnson and the Vietnam War

Rev. Kathryn Rateliff Barr has taught birth, parenting, vaccinations and alternative medicine classes since 1994. She is a pastoral family counselor and has parented birth, step, adopted and foster children. She holds bachelor's degrees in English and history from Centenary College of Louisiana. Studies include midwifery, naturopathy and other alternative therapies.

Ohio State nav bar

Ohio state navigation bar.

• BuckeyeLink
• Search Ohio State

The Korean War

History 3575: the korean war.

Get the latest news and stories from Tufts delivered right to your inbox.

Most popular.

• Activism & Social Justice
• Animal Health & Medicine
• Arts & Humanities
• Business & Economics
• Campus Life
• Climate & Sustainability
• Food & Nutrition
• Global Affairs
• Points of View
• Politics & Voting
• Science & Technology
• Alzheimer’s Disease
• Artificial Intelligence
• Biomedical Science
• Cellular Agriculture
• Cognitive Science
• Computer Science
• Cybersecurity
• Entrepreneurship
• Farming & Agriculture
• Film & Media
• Health Care
• Heart Disease
• Humanitarian Aid
• Immigration
• Infectious Disease
• Life Science
• Lyme Disease
• Mental Health
• Neuroscience
• Oral Health
• Performing Arts
• Public Health
• University News
• Urban Planning
• Visual Arts
• Youth Voting
• Cummings School of Veterinary Medicine
• Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy
• The Fletcher School
• Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
• Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences
• Jean Mayer USDA Human Nutrition Research Center on Aging
• Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life
• School of Arts and Sciences
• School of Dental Medicine
• School of Engineering
• School of Medicine
• School of the Museum of Fine Arts
• University College
• Australia & Oceania
• Canada, Mexico, & Caribbean
• Central & South America
• Middle East

Sayako Hiroi, "Why can't we be what we are for ourselves?," acrylic on canvas, 2023

Art That Is Not to Be Passed By

2024 MFA Thesis Exhibitions feature work from 27 graduating students

Printmaker Nina Montejano is interested in “depictions of architectural material surfaces that exist in places we pass by, through, or over,” she writes. For her thesis project, she reproduced the very floor that exhibit-goers tread upon. It took the form of a large screen print of a section of tile within the Aidekman Arts Center on the Medford/Somerville campus.

Quincey Spagnoletti, “The Room at the Top of the Stairs, No. 1,” 2022, archival inkjet print

“Creating these highly detailed copies helps us reconsider their originals,” Montejano explains in her artist statement.

She accompanies the piece with a thick binder of work orders for the building, dating back to 2011. The collected requests for replacement of stained or missing ceiling tiles, securing of a railing in the sculpture court, and countless other repairs read like a biography of this space that has been the backdrop for so many kinds of art over the years.

Montejano is just one of 27 graduating Master of Fine Arts students from SMFA at Tufts whose thesis works are now on display at the Tufts University Art Galleries at Aidekman Arts Center. The exhibit, Pulling Teeth and Jumping Rope , curated by Danni Shen, is free and open to the public.

As the exhibit’s description explains, many of the works reflect upon personal memory, through “dreamscapes, portals, wormholes, holes, and psychological landscapes rendered through a variety of mediums.”

Photographer Niko Krivanek, for example, presents black and white images of the natural environments surrounding correctional institutions—alongside a color portrait of their incarcerated mother, a photo it took years to arrange to take.

“To be able to see my mother through the viewfinder was the first time I’ve seen her beyond the walls of incarceration, to see her potential life after her release,” they write in their artist statement.

Many of the graduates took inspiration from their identities. 

Niko Krivanek, from the series “Natural Life,” silver gelatin print, 2024

The Cuban American artist W.O.V. explores taboo and queer subjects such as online pornography, fatphobia, camp, labor, and excess through painting and papermaking. 

Sayako Hiroi challenges Japanese female stereotypes in her paintings, which are marked by contoured fragmented bodies with undulated forms and textures; their vivid colors, she writes, draw inspiration from the rich palette of Japanese tradition. 

Meanwhile, Rachel A. Lee uses iconography indicative of the American South and objects associated with Korean culture, such as rounded white ceramic “moon jars,” to create a juxtaposed environment that is representative of her multi-racial identity.

Pulling Teeth and Jumping Rope  is on view through Sunday, May 19, at the not-to-be-passed-by Aidekman Arts Center on the Medford/Somerville campus.

Vintage Letterpress Offers Opportunities to Learn “through the Hands”

Kaylee Rose’s Everywhere Art

Rare Books as Tangible History